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Abstract
Civilians who have fled violent conflict and settled in neighboring countries are integral
to processes of civil war termination. Contingent on their attitudes, they can either back
peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting. Attitudes toward
peaceful settlement are expected to be especially obdurate for civilians who have been
exposed to violence. In a survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in 2016, we
use experiments to examine attitudes towards two critical phases of conflict termination – a
ceasefire and a peace agreement. We examine the rigidity/flexibility of refugees’ attitudes
to see if subtle changes in how wartime losses are framed or in who endorses a peace
process can shift willingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime. Our results
show, first, that refugees are far more likely to agree to a ceasefire proposed by a civilian
as opposed to one proposed by armed actors from either the Syrian government or the
opposition. Second, simply describing the refugee community’s wartime experience as
suffering rather than sacrifice substantially increases willingness to compromise with the
regime to bring about peace. This effect remains strong among those who experienced
greater violence. Together, these results show that even among a highly pro-opposition
population that has experienced severe violence, willingness to settle and make peace are
remarkably flexible and dependent upon these cues.
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1 Introduction
Terminating civil wars, let alone proceeding to reconcile and reintegrate civilian communi-
ties to realize lasting peace and avoid future conflict, poses many seemingly insurmountable
challenges. The Syrian conflict is a case in point. Ceasefires have been short-lived, millions
have been displaced, and a durable peace settlement has proven elusive. Do Syrian refugees
– and especially those who have experienced violence firsthand – support a ceasefire with
the incumbent regime? Under what conditions will refugees consider a peace agreement
that keeps Assad in power? When will they reject these types of compromise and instead
demand nothing short of fully removing the incumbent regime?
These are critical questions, for civilians who have fled violence and settled in neigh-
boring countries can be integral to ending or prolonging conflicts. Refugees can either
back ceasefires and peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting
(Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007, 2009). Furthermore, as surveys with Syrian
refugees in Turkey show, the majority want to return home and continue their lives in post-
civil war Syria (Erdogan, 2017). This makes their views integral to a durable settlement of
the conflict, as they will be in a position to provide recruits, support, and information (or
to withhold these things) to future armed groups. Finally, Syrians in Turkey are sending
remittances home, mostly to Aleppo and Damascus (Dean, 2015). These diaspora remit-
tance flows can affect civil war onset and recurrence, depending on whether remittances are
sent for peaceful purposes (Regan & Frank, 2014) or to finance rebel groups and terrorism
(Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2004; Elu & Price, 2012).
In this article, we examine Syrian refugees’ attitudes towards civil war termination.
Refugees are the victims of conflict, and victimization in war has been found to produce a
strong desire for revenge in contexts as diverse as the Balkans (Petersen, 2002), El Salvador
(Wood, 2003), Turkey (Tezcu¨r, 2016), Greece (Kalyvas, 2006) and Spain (Balcells, 2012),
spanning time and even generations. Although such a reaction may be understandable and
even intuitive, do the victimized indeed react in this way? And, if so, how obdurate are
their attitudes to change? In contrast to the work cited above, we treat these attitudes
as potentially flexible rather than assuming that they are forged definitively as a result of
wartime experiences. Using a new survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in
the fall of 2016, we examine two potentially powerful modifiers of attitudes towards will-
ingness to stop fighting, compromise, and make peace: (a) who is responsible for proposing
an agreement, particularly whether it is a Syrian civilian or Syrian armed actors; and (b)
how wartime experiences with violence are characterized – as sacrifice or as suffering.
The question of whether or not refugees’ views — even when forged amid traumatic ex-
perience — are indeed obdurate and vengeful has important implications for understanding
how attitudes are shaped in conflict settings as well as practical implications for bringing
about peace. The overwhelming majority of the refugees in Turkey have fled Syria as a
result of the attacks by Assad’s forces (Kiris¸ci, 2014), and therefore are believed to be
pro-opposition. In fact, about 70% of respondents in our sample see the opposition groups
in Syria as their closest representative, with the remainder saying that no one represents
them. There have been numerous attempts to bring the warring parties to comprise via a
negotiated solution, the most significant of which was the Annan plan. The plan failed, it
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is argued, because the already enormous scale of death and destruction made opposition
groups unwilling to compromise with the Assad regime (Lynch, 2016).
We find that even among refugee communities in Turkey—groups that have fled extreme
incumbent violence, overwhelmingly support Assad’s removal, and tend to identify with the
opposition— willingness to accept ceasefires, peaceful negotiations, and settlements that
leave Assad in power are contingent upon who advocates them and how past experiences
of violence are framed. Specifically, refugee civilians in our sample are 11 to 14 percentage
points more likely to agree with a ceasefire and peace process arrangement when proposed
by Syrian civilians as opposed to Syrian military commanders from either the regime or the
opposition, suggesting a special signaling value of civilian proposers of peace. In practice,
it also suggests that armed actors – from either side – may not be the most persuasive in
convincing traumatized civilian communities to compromise. Second, we find that framing
refugees’ collective experiences with violence as suffering rather than sacrifice increases
support for a peace agreement that involves compromising with the regime by 14 to 18
percentage points. This holds whether the suffering is described within the family or the
community, and it holds or is magnified among those who come from neighborhoods that
have experienced direct violence. Together, these findings provide two initial but powerful
examples of how small changes (1) in how peace processes are proposed or (2) in how
conflict narratives are constructed, can widely shift individual attitudes in ways that either
help or hinder compromise, and thus war termination via negotiated settlement.
2 Violence and the role of refugees in civil war
termination
Ceasefires and negotiated peace settlements have become increasingly important to conflict
termination in recent decades. Whereas during the cold war the vast majority of civil wars
ended in military victory (72%), in the 1990s, only 31% of wars ended in a military victory,
with the number decreasing to 11% between 2000 and 2007 (Hartzell, 2018).1 Although
negotiated settlements became the norm, their flaws and weaknesses also became increas-
ingly apparent. For example, Toft (2009) argues that the focus on negotiated settlements
is problematic in that such settlements are more likely to result in repeated outbreaks
of violence than outright victories. Such settlements often break down because of dis-
agreements over mutual disarmament and political power sharing (Fearon & Latin, 2008)
and/or because spoilers and veto players can spark a return to conflict (for example see
Kydd & Walter (2002); Stedman (1997); Newman & Richmond (2006)). Recent research
suggests that civil conflicts involving Jihadi groups are even less likely to end successfully
via negotiated settlement (Kalyvas, 2018).
To better understand the mechanisms behind these failures, the study of conflict termi-
nation has matured to incorporate the subcomponents of negotiated settlements—including
the nuances of ceasefires and peace agreements—into the broader scholarly agenda (A˚kebo,
2016; Karakus & Svensson, 2017). Nonetheless, we still lack micro-level studies of civil-
1There is some evidence to suggest that, as old cold-war rivalries resurface and international norms change,
military victories may be making a resurgence (Morje´ Howard & Stark, 2017).
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ians’ attitudes towards conflict termination arrangements—and especially the attitudes of
civilians who have been displaced from the war theater but wish to return. This is prob-
lematic, as research has shown that refugee populations can be an important source of
conflict diffusion and prolongation (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007, 2009). If
we wish to understand the feasibility of compromise with the incumbent regime as well
as the long-term viability of ceasefires and peace settlements in a given conflict, the views
of those who have fled across the border but remain deeply connected to war outcomes
cannot be ignored.
2.1 Attitudinal responses to violence
One would expect that refugees’ attitudes towards war termination will be shaped, at least
in part, by the violence they experienced during the war. A burgeoning scholarship on
civilian responses to violence acknowledges that attitudes are shaped by traumatic experi-
ences. This body of research, however, remains divided on whether such experiences result
in more hostile and war-prone vs. more pro-social, conciliatory and peaceful attitudinal
dispositions. For example, Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) find that exposure to terrorism and
political violence in Israel ‘hardens hearts’ against peace efforts. Focusing on the same
conflict, Grossman, Manekin & Miodownik (2015) show that exposure to high-intensity
combat hardens attitudes towards the rival and reduces support for negotiation and com-
promise among Israeli ex-combatants.2 On the other side of the ledger, Tellez (2018)
employs observational studies in Colombia, finding that areas more exposed to FARC-
related violence were more supportive of the referendum on a peace accord with FARC.
A quasi-experimental study of violence faced by Darfurian refugees similarly finds that
those exposed to greater violence within individual villages hold more pro-peace attitudes
(Hazlett, Hazlett).3
Setting aside the directional effects (pro-peace and compromising vs. anti-peace and
vengeful) of exposure to violence, one might also expect refugees’ attitudes—and espe-
cially attitudes about war termination—to be obdurate since they were forged in a context
characterized by traumatic experiences, including displacement, upheaval and worse. Still,
conflicts are partly battles over how people should think about the experience of war – par-
ticularly gains and losses, both in the past and the future (Kalyvas, 2006; Christia, 2012).
As with other processes of attitude-formation, how individuals understand the wages of
war (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012) and the advantages of conflict termination may depend on
2Examining possible mechanisms for this type of finding, Canetti et al. (2017) find that exposure to politi-
cal violence increases threat perception, psychological distress, and decreases support for political compromise.
Petersen (2002), who also homes in on mechanisms, uses emotional motivations to explain the attitudes and
behaviors of victimized communities that are driven to take up arms or otherwise support violence against their
perpetrators.
3A rich emerging literature also focuses on the effects of violence on a variety of outcomes including community
engagement, trust, and cooperation. Many of these studies find that violence produces ‘pro-social’ behavior (see
Bauer et al., 2016 for a recent review). However, as noted in Bauer et al. (2016), these apparently pro-social
behaviors are often parochial, directed towards the in-group members. The effects of violence on a broader
desire for peace and harmony with other groups remains unclear. For example, while Getmansky, Sinmazdemir
& Zeitzoff (2018) find that Turkish citizens in provinces with past history of violence have warmer attitudes
towards Syrian refugees, the article in this volume by Ghosn, Braithwaite & Chu (2019) does not find evidence
that past exposure to violence correlates with more positive sentiments towards Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
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how they are contextualized or framed. For instance, in this volume, Schon (2019) argues
that refugees’ migration decisions in the face of violence may depend on whether their
experience of violence can be reconciled with an existing narrative about security.
The ability to manipulate attitudes by varying how a piece of information is presented
is well known to scholars of public opinion (see e.g. Hurwitz, 1989; Maoz, 1990; Scheufele &
Tewksbury, 2007; Zaller, 1992). To this end, much work also has been done to demonstrate
how framing can shift the attitudes of Americans or other publics on the home-front. For
example, Boettcher III & Cobb (2009) examine whether framing US war casualties in Iraq
to American subjects as a ‘sacrifice’ influenced individuals’ commitment to continuing the
conflict. They find that the sacrifice frame strengthens hawks’ commitment, but weakens
that of doves. In a similar study, Schott, Scherer & Lambert (2011) find that the framing
effect of stating war casualties is moderated by the attainability of the military goal.
Can similar framing effects be found among civilian refugees who have recently fled an
active theater of war? Or are refugees’ attitudes firmly fixed by their experiences? Given
the logistical and security challenges associated with such research, there are few empirical
studies of civilian attitudes toward combatants and/or peace settlements during wartime,
and even fewer examining the strength of various framing effects that might influence these
attitudes. This is problematic because framing effects are expected to be weaker in issue
domains with high salience, as we would expect to be the case with attitudes about war
termination among refugees. In one notable exception, Corstange & York (2018) recently
conducted a survey experiment with Syrian refugees in Lebanon to investigate ‘how the
different war narratives spun by the government and the opposition affect how people view
the causes of war.’ (445) They find a sectarian framing effect ‘but only for some people,
and only when sheltered from discursive competitors,’ (450) and conclude that ‘elites are
more constrained in their ability to frame than we commonly suppose’ (450). Conversely,
in prior work on ‘intractable conflicts’ where opinions are also assumed to be strong and
fixed, Gayer et al. (2009) find that emphasizing possible future losses increases the chances
that Israeli participants will consider new peace options. We seek to build on this nascent
literature by studying how subtle shifts in the framing of proposed agreements (by varying
the proposer) or in the community’s experiences with violence (as sacrifice or suffering),
can alter attitudes regarding compromise towards war termination.
2.2 Who proposes peace?
One potentially powerful modifier of attitudes about conflict termination lies in cues about
the identity of who exactly is speaking out in favor of compromise and negotiation. Specif-
ically we examine whether it matters if it is a military elite actor (either from the regime
or opposition) or Syrian civilians who proposes a ceasefire. On one hand, military elites
may be more persuasive as spokespeople for peace, because they have more immediate
control over the use of violence, and so their advocacy of a ceasefire might be seen as
more valuable. Indeed, much of the political science research on civil conflict assumes that
militarized elites have control over civilians and their expressed attitudes toward allies and
enemies. As such, they are considered key actors who ultimately determine civilians’ po-
sitions on who to ally with, who to fight, and who to make peace with. (see e.g. Christia,
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2012; Varshney, 2003). It follows that military elites are therefore also typically considered
integral to securing durable peace settlements. Military elites are the ones at the nego-
tiating table, with much effort devoted to convincing them to lay down arms and accept
settlements such as power-sharing agreements.
On the other hand, there are several theoretical reasons to expect that civilian refugees
in our sample may find other Syrian civilians, broadly defined, to be more persuasive as
spokespeople for compromise, negotiation and peace. First, ‘informational social influ-
ence’ can be one powerful source of persuasion (Cialdini, 2001), in which a person who is
otherwise unsure of the correct behavior looks to others for information. Among factors
that may influence this process, the similarity of the messenger to the person receiving
the message can increase persuasive impact (e.g. Turner & Oakes, 1998). Whether our
respondents imagine a given Syrian civilian to be part of their community or not, they
surely see them as more similar in position and background than military elites. Relatedly,
‘self-categorization’ theory emphasizes that when individuals identify with a particular
group (here, as Syrian civilians as opposed to military elites), ‘sources’ in that group (here
other civilians) can obtain social influence on the ‘target’ (here, our respondent)(e.g. see
Turner & Oakes, 1998; Turner, 1991). In short, such theories would predict that a ceasefire
proposal made by other Syrian civilians would be more persuasive simply because those
civilians have much more in common with our respondents than do military elites: if other
civilians—who may have faced similar hardships as a result of the war—are willing to ad-
vocate a compromise via a ceasefire, this may persuade the respondents that they should
do the same.
Second, cues showing that other Syrian civilians support a ceasefire could make respon-
dents feel that it is socially permissible and safe to speak out in favor of conflict termination.
Such cues might be particularly salient in communities that would otherwise impose an ex-
pectation to seek revenge in response to past violence.4 Even without cultural, emotional,
or psychological dimensions, immediate security concerns alone may force respondents to
care about what other civilians think. Community members may worry about informants,
and in our case, especially informants working for the opposition. These informants can
provide important information to their patrons (opposition leaders and fighters), including
the identity of regime sympathizers (see e.g. Kalyvas, 2006). Syrian refugees in Turkey,
many of whom fled from opposition held territory, may feel obligated to show full-throated
support for putative, pro-opposition objectives, and thus express a refusal to compromise
with the Syrian government for fear of raising suspicion that they are regime sympathizers.
Only if they believe that compromising with the regime would be seen as acceptable in
the wider Syrian community – such as when another civilian proposes it – could they show
support.
Furthering this ‘permissibility’ logic, we also consider the possibility that some types
of civilians may have greater authority than others in ‘making it okay to support peace’.
In particular, we consider those who have been permanently injured, and thus must suffer
on an ongoing basis as a result of that loss. Such individuals may be expected to show an
4More broadly, this has been theorized in the form of the ‘culture of honor’ (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), which
proposes that in some cultures, members are socially obligated to show a desire for vengeance.
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understandable desire for vengeance, but if they instead speak out in support for peace,
it may strongly signal that doing so is permissible. We thus examine whether a civilian
individual who has lost a limb due to regime violence may be even more persuasive than
an unspecified Syrian ‘civilian’ in influencing our respondents’ stated acceptance of peace.
On a more pragmatic note, the question of the identity of the spokesperson for a ceasefire
and eventual war termination is also directly relevant in the ongoing efforts to end the civil
war in Syria. First, since the third round of the Geneva peace talks between the Syrian
government and the opposition, UN Special Envoy Steffan de Mistura has consulted civil
society organizations such as the Women’s Advisory Board, the Civil Society Support
Room, and the Experts Room (Alzoubi, 2017). However, these civil society organizations
have been asking for a more extensive role in peace talks (Zena, 2017). Second, civilians
have been actively involved in the negotiation of local ceasefires in various areas of conflict
in Syria as well (Araabi & Hilal, 2016). It is also worth noting that these civilian negotiators
are not necessarily elites distant from our respondents. These civilian actors include a mix
of local notables and activists as well as Syrians with different occupations, such as doctors
and teachers. About 3% of our sample also consists of teachers, suggesting that civilian
negotiators do not necessarily have backgrounds and qualities that are drastically different
from those of our respondents. The impact of civilians, and especially of local notables,
in these negotiations have been arguably both positive and negative (see e.g. Karakus &
Svensson, 2017; Araabi & Hilal, 2016). Our experiments shed light on this critical issue by
studying whether the inclusion of Syrian civilian actors in ceasefire processes makes these
agreements more acceptable to Syrian refugees, many of whom hope to return home.
2.3 Framing losses: Sacrifice vs. suffering
In an interview with the Guardian, Free Syrian Army commander, Abu al-Farouq, said:
‘Any truce with the regime is unacceptable after all the sacrifices we made.’5 By contrast,
in the fourth round of Geneva peace talks, while addressing representatives of Assad’s
government and the opposition, UN Special Envoy de Mistura used a different framing,
‘The Syrian people desperately all want an end to this conflict and you all know it [...]
They are waiting for a relief from their own suffering and dream of a new road out of this
nightmare to a new and normal future in dignity.’6 These two examples illustrate use of the
terms ‘sacrifice’ and ‘suffering’ by actors in the Syrian conflict to argue for or against war
termination. Are they in fact persuasive? In this section we turn to theoretical motivations
for our second experiment, which examines how the framing of wartime experiences as
sacrifice or as suffering influences willingness to settle in order to achieve peace.
Beginning with the term ‘sacrifice’, we consider first ‘escalation of commitment’ (or the
sunk cost fallacy), a concept that has been widely invoked in numerous disciplines with
roots in prospect theory7 and, in the context of social groupings, in social identification
5Emphasis added. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/11/
war-in-syria-how-my-life-has-changed
6Emphasis added. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/
syrias-warring-sides-face-off-as-u-n-tells-them-end-the-nightmare-idUSKBN16217C
7For a general overview of prospect theory see: Kahneman & Tversky (1984). For a review of prospect theory
in political science see: McDermott (2004); Levy (1992).
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theory (see e.g. Dietz-Uhler, 1996). Individuals do not wish to seek their past behaviors
‘wasted’ by giving up on the purpose for which they originally acted, even when continuing
the same behavior is irrational (Staw, 1976). Rather, when faced with losses, they may
double down on their original commitment rather than abandon it (Arkes & Blumer, 1985;
Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Weber & Zuchel, 2005). These concepts are particularly relevant
in a conflict setting like the Syrian Civil War, where the losses incurred after an uprising
may be well beyond the scale that any of the original participants imagined. Accordingly,
we expect that the word ‘sacrifice’ will have the effect of engaging a sunk-cost type of
thinking: e.g. so much has been invested in this conflict, how could one give up and settle
with Assad now?
By comparison, the term ‘suffering’ also implies a loss, but emphasizes the pain of that
loss. As argued in earlier work on ‘war-weariness’, those who feel the painful repercussions
of violence most strongly may also be inclined to avoid future violence, to compromise and
bring about peace.8 Moreover, by priming loss without referencing the goals for which that
loss was made, the word ‘suffering’ is less likely to engage sunk-cost reasoning compared
to ‘sacrifice’. Thus, we expect the ‘suffering’ prime to trigger thinking along the following
lines: we have faced so much hardship already, perhaps ending this conflict is the best thing
for the community.
Accordingly, we examine reactions to loss framed as Community sacrifice, or as Com-
munity suffering. We were further interested in whether characterizing losses as community
suffering may be too broad or remote a prime, and whether there might be a stronger re-
action to framing the conflict in terms of suffering within one’s family itself. We thus also
consider a Family suffering frame.9
3 Methods
Our sampling strategy involved three stages, described in the Appendix. The vast major-
ity of Syrian refugees in Turkey live outside refugee camps in urban neighborhoods. We
sampled Turkish provinces with the highest number of Syrians present: Istanbul, Hatay,
Sanliurfa and Gaziantep.The resulting sample includes 1,120 out-of-camp Syrians, making
this survey, to our knowledge, the largest and most comprehensive survey of political at-
titudes of Syrian refugees in Turkey. While showing some variation across provinces, our
response rate was 34%.Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of the sample by Syrian
governorate. Figure 2 shows the distribution of key demographic characteristics. Over-
whelmingly, individuals reported leaving Syria due to security concerns, with 80% leaving
in 2013 or later when the fighting became more severe, especially in and around Aleppo.
Finally, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 each have four conditions, and random assign-
ment is done with equal probability of receiving each prime, independently between the
8For a review of the war weariness literature, see e.g. Levy & Morgan (1986), though it has been generally
applied to international conflicts and study of war recurrence or initiation. More recent empirical findings
supportive of a ‘weary’ effect of violence on attitudes toward peace in the context of civil conflict can be found
in Tellez (2018) and Hazlett (Hazlett).
9In principal we could have added a framing around family level sacrifice as well, but given power limitations
we did not wish to add a fifth condition.
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two experiments.
Figure 1. Locations of origins and barrel bombing incidence
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3.1 Experiment 1: Identity of a ceasefire proposer
Experiment one examines how the identity of who is proposing a conflict termination
arrangement (here, a ceasefire and return to peaceful negotiation) affects respondents’
willingness to accept it, and particularly whether a Syrian civilian proposer engenders
higher agreement than those of armed actors on either side. To explore this, we randomly
assigned each respondent to a condition in which the person proposing a ceasefire could
be:
1. A commander of the Syrian Army
2. A commander from the Syrian opposition
3. A civilian non-combatant who has lost a limb during the war
4. A civilian non-combatant
Participants are then prompted with a statement about a hypothetical ceasefire, saying
that the assigned actor ‘spoke out in favor of laying down arms and returning to a non-
violent political process.’ We then ask respondents about their level of agreement with
the statement (Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neutral, Somewhat agree, Strongly
agree).
3.2 Experiment 2: Framing of wartime experiences
Experiment two is designed to determine whether the willingness to compromise for peace
(here, accept a peace agreement that includes a role for the Assad regime in governance,
versus demanding the regime’s full removal) depends upon how wartime experiences of
violence are framed. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to one of four prime
conditions:
A. Family suffering : ‘As we’ve discussed, you and your family have lost and suffered
through a lot during this conflict.’
B. Community suffering : ‘I don’t need to tell you, your community has lost an enormous
amount and suffered considerably since the war began.’
C. Community sacrifice: ‘I don’t need to tell you, a lot of people, possibly some from
your own community, have fought hard and sacrificed a lot to get to this point.’
D. Original motives: ‘Recalling for a moment what motivations led people such as you
or members of your community to initially want a change and try to make a better
Syria, what would you say the main reason was?’
After the prime, participants were then asked ‘Given this, what kind of political settle-
ment do you think the leadership that most closely represents you should accept in order
to put an end to the violence?’, with four answer options:
1. Accept a peace settlement that ends the fighting, regardless of who maintains control.
2. Accept a peace settlement that ends the fighting, but only if Syria becomes a federal
country with some areas outside of the Assad regime’s control.
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3. Accept a peace settlement that ends the fighting, but only if the regime is removed
entirely from Syria.
4. No political settlement is acceptable, fighting should continue until a outright military
victory.
We note that one challenge with this question is that there is no natural ‘control con-
dition.’ Respondents have some mental state and information in mind at the time of
questioning. We thus must rely on comparisons between conditions – for example, com-
paring attitudes under the Community suffering prime to outcomes under the Community
sacrifice prime – to ascertain whether attitudes depend on the prime, and the relative
differences between any two primes.
Finally, to study whether these primes also influence reported beliefs about the potential
for (opposition) victory in the conflict, we also ask our respondents to assess the likelihood
of opposition victory (very likely, somewhat likely, chances are even, somewhat unlikely, or
very unlikely). We map these to probabilities 0, .25, .5, .75, and 1 for purposes of simple
and interpretable analysis below.
3.3 Hypotheses
In Experiment 1, we are first interested in whether support for a ceasefire is higher when
a Syrian civilian proposes it, than when either opposition or regime commanders propose
it. Second, to examine whether high agreement with a civilian proposal is really just high
agreement with somebody presumed to take an opposition proposition, we look to the
sub-sample of respondents who explicitly reported that they identify with the opposition,
thereby allowing us to determine if support for a Syrian civilian-proposed ceasefire remains
higher than a Syrian opposition commander-proposed ceasefire even within this group. We
thus explore:
H1a: Respondents are more likely to favor a ceasefire when it is proposed by a Syrian
civilian than when it is proposed by a Syrian military elite from either side (regime
or opposition).
H1b: Even respondents who report that ‘the opposition most closely represents them’
are more likely to support a ceasefire proposed by a Syrian civilian than one proposed
by a Syrian opposition commander.
For Experiment 2, our key comparisons aim first to determine if willingness to settle
with the regime varies depending on whether violence is framed as community sacrifice,
community suffering, family suffering, or a prime to recall the original motives for the
uprising.10 We are further interested in whether the effect of sacrifice versus suffering is
sustained in communities that experience the most violence and thus may have the most
hardened attitudes. We thus examine:
H2a: Approval of settlements with the regime will be lower when violence is framed
as Community sacrifice than when framed as Community suffering.
10When asked what they believe the original motives for the rebellion were, the most common responses were:
to stand against oppression or tyranny (42%); to stand against the regime or the Assad regime (33%), to stand
against disorder (8%), to stand for freedom (4%), and to stand corruption (3%).
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H2b: Approval of settlements with the regime will be lower when violence is framed
as Community sacrifice than when framed as Family suffering.
H2c: A prime to recall the original motives will not detectably alter approval for
settlement compared to Community sacrifice.
H3: Among respondents from neighborhoods that have suffered deaths and injuries,
approval of settlement with the regime will be lower when violence is framed as
Community sacrifice, than when framed as Community suffering (H3a) or as Family
suffering (H3b).
Finally, in Section 3.2 we described ‘perceived chances of opposition victory’ as an ad-
ditional outcome variables in Experiment 2. Our aim in adding this is to better understand
the impact of the sacrifice versus suffering framings mechanistically, by examining whether
this framing also appears to influence participants’ ‘optimism’ about opposition victory.
Thus a fourth and final hypothesis to examine is
H4: Violence framed as community sacrifice will make respondents more optimistic
about the likelihood of an opposition victory against the incumbent regime.
3.4 Estimation procedures
For both experiments, because the primes are randomized, no adjustment or conditioning
is required, and we simply conduct difference-in-means tests allowing unequal variance. We
present randomization checks in the Appendix.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We begin by briefly describing our respondents’ attitudes about war termination, and how
they relate observationally to their exposure to violence during the civil war in Syria. The
Appendix provides a detailed description of the questions in the survey instrument used to
construct these variables.
Table I provides means on a number of variables. The first group gives the proportion
of the sample choosing each of various proposed conflict outcomes as ‘preferred’.11 The
next group asks which outcomes participants expect. Finally, we also show the proportion
of respondents who say they will not return to Syria. As expected, our sample is heavily
pro-opposition, as the mean values for the political attitude variables shows. About 81%
of the sample sees Assad’s removal as a preferred resolution to the conflict, while only
24% sees settlement with Assad as a preferred outcome. It is also worth noting that the
level of support for federation and partition is very low, about 4%. Finally, only 8% of
our sample does not want to return to Syria under any circumstances. Hence, our sample
consists of individuals who eventually plan to return to Syria, and may thereby play a role
11The translation of ‘preferred’ in this case connotes ‘a good outcome’, not the single best outcome. Hence
participants can choose more than one outcome, as indicated by the variable ‘Total endings chosen’.
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Table I. Political attitudes
Question N Mean
Preferred ending:
Settlement with Assad 1,027 0.24
Removal of Assad 1,036 0.81
Demilitarization 1,009 0.56
Federation 1,023 0.04
Partition 1,047 0.04
Total endings chosen 961 1.68
Expected ending:
Settlement with Assad 1,003 0.23
Removal of Assad 967 0.80
Demilitarization 947 0.57
Partition 945 0.07
Federation 916 0.03
Total endings expected 876 1.70
Other:
Will not return to Syria 1,083 0.08
Mean values for a set of political attitudes asked in the survey. The number of observations differs because of
missing values.
in the future of the country. This makes learning about their political attitudes towards
negotiated settlement and compromise, and how these attitudes can be affected, critically
important.
4.2 Experiment 1: Civilian versus military proposers
For the analysis of Experiment 1, we simply collapse response categories into an agree
category (including ‘strongly’- or ‘somewhat agree’) and a disagree category (including
‘somewhat’- or ‘strongly disagree’). We also collapse the two Syrian civilian messenger
primes (a civilian non-combatant who has lost a limb during the war, and a civilian non-
combatant) into one ‘civilian’ category.12
Figure 3 shows the proportion who agree to a ceasefire, with 95% confidence intervals
for each prime category. Hypothesis 1a was that respondents will be more in favor of
ceasefire when it is another Syrian civilian calling for it as opposed to when a military elite
calls for it. We see this clearly: respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to agree
to a ceasefire and peaceful negotiations when it is put forth by a fellow civilian than by
a Syrian government commander (p = 0.002), and 14 percentage points more likely than
when an opposition commander makes the proposal (p < 0.001).
Moving to hypothesis 1b, we note that our sample mostly consists of respondents who
self-identify as pro-opposition, though there is a sizable minority who thinks that no side
in the conflict represents them.13 One possible explanation for the positive effect of the
12Our results remain substantially unchanged if we keep these primes separate – the two groups are statistically
indistinguishable, so collapsing them together aids in achieving statistical power.
13We asked in the survey which group in the conflict most closely represents the interests of the respondent.
72% say it is the opposition, while the rest almost exclusively says ‘no one’. Fewer than 0.5% said Assad’s
13
Syrian civilian proposer relative to even the opposition commander is that it is driven
by the large minority of respondents in our sample who do not think that the opposition
groups represent them. Hypothesis 1b thus asks: even among those individuals who iden-
tify closely with the opposition, do we still see higher support for the civilian-proposed
arrangement than the one proposed by an opposition commander? Figure 4 shows results
under each prime, now restricted to those who report identifying with opposition groups
in Syria. Proposals made by a Syrian civilian draw greater support than those made by
an opposition commander even in this subset of respondents that might be expected to be
most sympathetic to proposals made by the opposition commanders.
The persuasive effect of civilian proposals is consistent with the varied theoretical moti-
vations described above for attempting this manipulation. Seeing a Syrian civilian propose
an agreement may assure the respondent that agreeing to such a position will not be viewed
as violating the group’s expectations, or worse, as raising suspicion of sympathies with the
enemy. Alternatively, respondents may simply be influenced by civilians rather than elites
because, whomever they imagine this unnamed civilian to be, they are much more similar
(e.g. Turner & Oakes, 1998), and likely have a more common plight than can be said of
military elites. That said, as we do not know who our respondents imagine the civilian in
our prompts to be, a number of open questions remain that we discuss in Section 5.
We next study how the framing of those violent experiences themselves influence will-
ingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime.
Proportion agreeing to peace
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Syrian commander
Opp. commander
Civilian
l
l
l
Figure 3. Effect of proposer on agreement to a ceasefire.
Proportion of respondents willing to agree to ‘laying down arms and returning to a non-violent political process’,
conveyed by either a civilian (Civilian) – collapsing together injured and non-injured civilians – an opposition
commander (Opp. commander) or a commander with the government (Syrian commander). Whiskers show 95%
confidence intervals. Agreements proposed by civilians are more likely to be accepted than those proposed by
commanders from either side.
government represents them.
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Proportion agreeing to peace
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Figure 4. Effect of proposer on agreement to a ceasefire (only pro-opposition respondents).
Proportion of respondents willing to agree to ‘laying down arms and returning to a non-violent political process’,
conveyed by either a civilian (Civilian), an opposition commander (Opp. commander), or a commander with
the government (Syrian commander). Restricted to those who say opposition groups represent their interests.
Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals.
4.3 Experiment 2: Framing wartime experiences
For analysis of Experiment 2, the outcome is coded as a 1 for participants that are willing
to settle in some way with the regime to achieve peace (accepting a peace settlement
regardless of who maintains control, or accepting a peace settlement that leaves some parts
of the country under the Assad regime’s control). It is thus coded as 0 for the outcomes
that do not involve any settling or compromise, insisting on removing the regime entirely.
It therefore encodes whether the respondent is willing to accept any settlement with the
Assad regime, versus demanding a future that leaves the regime with no power. We then
simply compute conditional means for this outcome variable by prime, which are shown
with 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5.
Hypotheses 2a-2c are analyzed in Figure 5. Violence framed as Community sacrifice
made respondents less willing to settle with the regime compared to violence framed as
Community suffering or Family suffering. Specifically, compared to those in the sacrifice
condition, those in the Community suffering and Family suffering condition were 18 per-
centage points (p < 0.001) and 14 percentage points (p < 0.001) (H2b) more likely to
approve of a settlement with the regime.
Finally, the prime to recall the original motives of the conflict produces a level of
willingness marginally higher than Community sacrifice (8 percentage points, p = 0.054)
(H2c), though still considerably lower than Community suffering (10 percentage points,
p = 0.02). A prime to recall the original motives thus falls squarely in between the ‘sacrifice’
and the ‘suffering’ primes in terms of willingness to settle.
Next, it could be either that prior experience with the types of violent harms we ref-
erence makes the primes more salient, or that prior experience hardens attitudes, thus
making them unlikely to be influenced by such primes. To examine this, we split the
sample according to whether individuals report that members of their neighborhood were
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Proportion willing to compromise with the regime
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Original motives
Family suffering
Community suffering
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Figure 5. Effects of primes on willingness to settle
Results of survey experiment on framing of losses. The outcome is 1 if participants accept a deal that settles
with the regime, leaving it some power; it is 0 if they accept only outcomes that entirely remove the regime from
power. Estimates show effect of each prime, relative to a prime reminding participants of the original motives
for the rebellion.
injured or killed in the conflict (H3). Figure 6 shows results similar to Figure 5 but on
these split samples. Among those who did have neighbors injured or killed (‘neighborhood
hurt’), compared to the Community sacrifice prime, willingness to settle was 24 percentage
points higher among those primed to Community suffering, and 27 percentage points higher
among those primed to Family suffering. These point estimates are indeed larger (though
not significantly so) than the corresponding effects in the sample without neighborhood
members injured or killed (18 and 7 percentage points, respectively).
We thus find that prior experience with community loss does not detectably weaken,
and may actually enhance, the effect of these primes on willingness to settle. It is also
worth noticing that, while not a causally identified comparison, the overall willingness to
settle is higher among those from the neighborhoods that have experienced losses.
Proportion willing to compromise with the regime
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
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Neighborhood hurt
Proportion willing to compromise with the regime
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Original motives
Family suffering
Community suffering
Community sacrifice
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Neighborhood not hurt
Figure 6. Effect of sacrifice/suffering primes, by neighborhood exposure to violence
Results of survey experiment on framing of losses separately for those with members of their neighborhood who
were injured or killed (left, N=376) and those who have no injured or killed members of their neighborhood (right,
N=659). The outcome is one if participants accept a peace settlement that does not require defeat/removal of
the regime, or zero if they accept only outcomes that entirely remove the regime from power
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Finally, while we do not theorize about the role of these primes in affecting beliefs
about the prospects for opposition victory, we are well positioned to explore this, and it
suggests a possible mechanism by which these primes might influence willingness to settle.
Figure 7 provides an exploration of Hypothesis 4. The same primes that generated the
lowest willingness to settle (i.e. Community sacrifice) in prior analysis generate the highest
optimism regarding the likelihood of victory for the opposition. Specifically, optimism for
an opposition victory under the Community sacrifice prime is 7 percentage points higher
(p = 0.002) than under the Community suffering prime, and 10 percentage points higher
(p < 0.001) under the family suffering prime. The difference between Community sacrifice
and Original motives is not significant at 4 percentage points (p = 0.13).
Expectation of opposition victory
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Original motives
Family suffering
Community suffering
Community sacrifice
l
l
l
l
Figure 7. Expectation of opposition victory depending on framing of loss
Mean probability that the opposition will defeat the regime, by prime. Optimism that the opposition will defeat
the regime is far higher under the Community sacrifice prime than either Community suffering or Family suffering
prime.
This result suggests that framing violence as sacrifice not only increases demands for
removal of Assad, but also increases optimism regarding the likelihood of this outcome.
This raises an interesting question to be pursued in future work: does the Community
sacrifice prime, which emphasizes sunk costs, increase demands for victory because it
alters the way respondents view conflict odds, making them more optimistic that victory
is actually possible? Or does the prime simply increase demands for victory, after which
participants later say they are more optimistic about that victory in order to maintain
internal consistency? Or is a third factor responsible for both? Whatever the causal
ordering, the surprisingly large effects of such subtle primes on both the optimism and
demand for Assad’s complete removal from power suggests that the social framing of losses
can powerfully alter the policies refugees will support to terminate conflicts.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Civil conflicts are the dominant form of war, giving rise to death, mass displacement, ex-
tremism and illicit economic activity well beyond the war theater (Melander, Pettersson
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& Themne´r, 2016). While political and military elites will strike bargains, settlements
that achieve lasting peace require buy-in from civilian communities, including refugees.
The effects of wartime experiences on civilian attitudes towards settlements – especially in
conflicts where the objective is not to control the population but to remove it – are not
well understood. Although one may expect experiences with violence to produce obdurate
attitudes regarding the acceptability of peaceful settlements, we instead find surprising
flexibility in these attitudes. Specifically, we find that the identity of the person propos-
ing a ceasefire, and narratives that frame past violence can both strongly influence the
compromises refugees are willing to accept to end fighting.
When a ceasefire is proposed by a Syrian civilian, it is deemed acceptable far more
often than when proposed by military elites from either side. This finding is interesting for
several reasons. First, elites – especially armed ones – are typically viewed as the key actors
in securing peace settlements: they sit at the negotiating table, command their forces, and
are often assumed to influence civilians’ disposition towards who is an enemy or an ally.
Yet, in this particular group of refugees in Turkey, civilian voices more effectively persuade
our respondents to accept a ceasefire and return to peaceful negotiations. This holds even
among respondents who identify most closely with the opposition, suggesting it does not
merely reflect persuasion by those with similar political leanings.
These results are consistent with several theoretical positions. First, under uncertainty,
civilians may look for information or evidence from fellow civilians, who can reasonably be
assumed to be more similar to the respondent than can be said of military commanders
on either side. Or, civilians may worry that expressing a desire for peace will violate
community expectations or raise suspicion – both of which can be allayed by a Syrian
civilian being the one to propose the agreement. Alternatively, after suffering so much
violence, civilians may also simply be wary of proposals made by armed actors on either
side.
We note that our prompt naming a civilian as the proposer of peace was not specific,
and thus we do not know what sort of civilian our respondents imagine this proposer to be.
This has consequences for the applicability of ‘similarity-based influence’ theories we cited
above. On the one hand, it may be that the generality of the prime does not much matter:
regardless of the particular type of civilian imagined by the respondent, any civilian is much
more like the respondent than a military commander is. On the other hand, interesting
heterogeneity may go unnoticed in this design. It is possible that certain civilian types
would be more persuasive than others, such as civilians who are also refugees in Turkey, or
at least known to be pro-opposition, as compared to those who are still in Syria or support
the regime. If so, the persuasive effects of having a civilian propose an agreement could
potentially be much largely in some cases than the average we see here. Future research
could usefully examine how these finer features of a civilian endorser’s identity alter their
influence.
There is an ongoing debate about the importance and effectiveness of including civilian
actors’ in these negotiations (Nilsson, 2018; Zanker, 2014). Our finding that a civilian-
proposed ceasefire elicits greater support is particularly informative in this case, where one
might expect nothing to move refugee attitudes given the horrific forms of violence they
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have endured. This suggests it is reasonable to expect a similar or even greater ability
of civilian-proposals to influence attitudes among those who have experienced less severe
violence.
Our second main finding is that wartime experience characterized as sacrifice makes
respondents more likely to call for outright victory against the regime, whereas charac-
terizing these experiences as suffering heightens their willingness to agree to settlements
allowing the regime to retain some power. This holds among those who report experi-
encing greater harm, who might be most expected to have firm preferences. Again these
results are consistent with several theoretical accounts. The word ‘sacrifice’ may engage
an escalation of commitment in participants’ thinking, making the idea of ‘giving up’ (by
agreeing to a settlement with Assad) less palatable. It may also lead respondents to feel
that settling would be seen as a betrayal of the community and what it has fought for.
By comparison, the word ‘suffering’ may raise the salience of how the violence has harmed
individuals, their families, and their communities, without emphasizing what was intended
to be gained. This may engage heightened ‘weariness’ and a desire to see violence come
to an end. These primes also have an effect on reported optimism regarding prospects
for an opposition victory. Respondents primed to think about their wartime experience
as sacrifice were more optimistic that the opposition will be victorious over the regime,
compared to those primed to think of these experiences as suffering. Future research would
be required to claim any causal ordering of these effects: It could be that this increased
optimism a) leads to a lower willingness to settle; b) that the lower willingness to settle
comes first and participants update their optimism in order to maintain consistency; or
that c) some other effect of the primes leads to both outcomes.
Finally, our findings also have practical implications for efforts to end conflicts through
lasting settlements. Experiment 1 suggests that focusing negotiations entirely around
armed elites may be unproductive, as they are less able to persuade the broader pop-
ulation that such a settlement is desirable, potentially paving the way for new violence
entrepreneurs to mobilize. Inclusion of civilians in peace processes, by contrast, can aid
in ensuring broader support for such arrangements once reached. Second, our finding that
willingness to settle is strongly influenced by the framing of wartime experiences – as sac-
rifice or as suffering – suggests that public discussion and dialogues may help or hinder in
preparing for the way for peace, depending upon which of these narratives are emphasized.
Replication statement
The dataset, survey, and R files required to replicate these results, along with the online
appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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